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Papua New Guinea is rich in natural resources, including minerals, oil, gas, timber and fish, and 
cash crops such as coffee, palm oil, cocoa, copra, rubber, tea and spices which contribute 
significantly to Papua New Guinea’s overall development. Several mining, oil and gas companies 
are currently operating in Porgera, Ok Tedi, Lihir, Hidden Valley, Sinivit, Simberi, Tolukuma, 
Kutubu and Gobe. The operations of these companies have generated an estimated K13.42 
billion to Papua New Guinea’s economy. Landowners affected by these developments also 
receive royalties from those operations. However this wealth has not been translated into 
tangible human development across the country, as shown in persistently poorly performing 
social indicators. Instead income from the exploitation of natural resources is being used in 
unplanned projects and not focused on the delivery of core social functions, such as the 
provision of a stable and non-distorting policy aimed at building and sustaining the development 
of a modern market, and legislative and regulatory frameworks, social services, social security 
and social infrastructure which would lead to the improvement in the delivery of essential 
services to all Papua New Guineans. There is widespread evidence of benefits not being 
distributed to all landowners. Landowners are yet to fulfil their aspirations regarding these 
developments and to see improvements in their living standards. This paper discusses two case 
studies: the Porgera and Lihir mines, outlining the landowners associations’ experiences, which 
illustrate issues of governance and management of the distribution of benefit flows from the 
exploitation of Papua New Guinea’s natural resource wealth. 
The focus of the article’s discussion is on governance and management issues that affect the 
distribution of benefits, delivery of essential services to rural areas of PNG, stability within 
government, and the expectations of landowners. 
Introduction  
According to the law of Papua New Guinea (PNG), the state owns all the country’s land1 and water,2 including 
mineral3 and petroleum4 resources. However, PNG landowners do not accept this law. They have difficulties in 
reconciling this concept of ownership with their customary/traditional way of life,5 which maintains that the 
clan should be the primary arbiter of ownership, and any issuance of leases over land for resource 
development should require the consent of the landowning communities.6 The clans, in most cases, hold a 
strong bargaining position in negotiations over resource7 developments, and demands for compensation is 
firmly on their agenda. Landowners receive 40 per cent of benefits flows including: (i) mitigation projects – in 
funding provisions for social infrastructure, such as schools, health services (aid-posts) and roads; (ii) first 
preferences for employment; (iii) project community relations extension support in the field of primary health 
care, business development and land mobilisation; (iv) enhanced education and training opportunities, and 
                                                        
1  Land Act 1996 (PNG) s 4 – National title to land. 
2  Water Resources Act 1982 (PNG) s 5 – Vesting of Rights in the State. 
3  Mining Act 1992 (PNG) s 5 – All minerals are the property of the State. 
4  Oil and Gas Act 1998 s 6 – Petroleum and helium are the property of the state; Tony Power, ‘Landowner Compensation: 
Policy and Practice’ in Susan Toft (ed), Compensation for Resource Development in Papua New Guinea (National Centre 
for Development Studies and Resource Management in Asia-Pacific Project, ANU, and Law Reform Commission, PNG, 1997) 
85. 
5  Ibid. 
6  Glenn Banks, ‘Understanding “Resource” Conflicts in Papua New Guinea’ (2008) 49(1) Asia Pacific Viewpoint 24. 
7  Ibid. 
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support for cultural and sporting activities; and (v) preferential treatment of landowner companies for 
business spin-offs.8 
However, governance issues involving the management and distribution of benefits flows and the wealth 
generated from mining operations have impacted on the delivery of essential services and expectations of 
landowners. 
Minerals and mining policy 
Prior to 1989, PNG’s minerals and mining policy was directed at the distribution of resource rent, mineral 
rights and sovereign risk assessment.9 Landowners were not directly involved in negotiations concerning major 
resource development; they were merely consulted and then their interests were presented in the negotiation 
process. Benefits to landowners, if any, were set out in contracts, such as the Mining (Bougainville Copper 
Agreement) Act 1967 or the Mining (Ok Tedi Agreement) Act 1976, between the state and the developer. This 
policy applied to all major commercial projects, regardless of the nature of the landowners’ stake in the 
project, until after the Bougainville conflict, when the government undertook a review of the minerals and 
mining policy. The review led to the introduction of the new Mining Act 1992. The Mining Act 1992 and the 
Petroleum Act 1992, now the Oil and Gas Act 1998, provide for consultation10 and development forum11 
processes involving landowners, and provincial and local-level governments. This was to ensure that the views 
of persons affected by project proposals are considered and thus help to minimise disputes in relation to 
projects. Landowners now negotiate how benefits from major projects will be distributed during a 
development forum process12 and the agreements reached lead to the state and landowners to the signing of 
specific agreements (Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)) confirming the terms of their benefit sharing 
arrangements and obligations to ensure delivery and continuation of the security of the project. Under an 
MOA,13 benefits are provided in: (i) royalties – revenue allocated to the provincial government (hosting the 
project);14 (ii) special support grants (SSG) – grants allocated to the provincial government (host province) as 
budget support for infrastructure development (deliver goods and services to the project area, and facilitate 
the development and operation of the project);15 and (iii) state equity – 22.5 per cent from petroleum 
projects16 and 30 per cent from mining projects,17 a share of which is also allocated to the provincial 
government hosting the project to support the development of infrastructure, and delivery of goods and 
services. 
Case studies 
While there is now an approach that aims to share benefits from the exploitation of natural resources, and 
customary landowners are given more status in the negotiation of benefits as new natural resource projects 
are developed, it is not necessarily the case that there are improvements in the livelihood of the customary 
landowners or that their expectations are fulfilled.18 More governance initiatives are required to ensure that 
there is equitable distribution of benefits and to ensure that all citizens are empowered to participate in 
social and economic development, as enshrined in the Constitution.19  Various factors, for example, lack of 
service delivery due to weak public capacity to implement expenditure plans, including on key essential social 
                                                        
8  Power, above n 4, 86-7. 
9  Colin Filer, ‘Resource Rents’ in Ila Temu (ed), Papua New Guinea: A 20/20 Vision (National Centre for Development 
Studies, Research School of Pacific & Asian Studies, ANU, Pacific Policy Paper 20, 1997) 225; M Taylor and K Whimp, 
‘Report on Land Issues and Hydrocarbon Framework Study’ (Port Moresby: Fuels and Energy Management Group for 
Department of Petroleum and Energy, 1997) 19. 
10 Mining Act 1992 (PNG), s 3 – Consultation; Organic Law on Provincial Government and Local-Level Government, s 116 –
Consultation. 
11 Oil and Gas Act 1998 (PNG), s 48 – Development Forum. 
12 Banks, above n 6, 24-25 [4] 
13 Mining Act 1992 (PNG), s 16A – Acquisition of State Interests. 
14 Oil and Gas Act 1998, s 159 - Royalty. 
15 Oil and Gas Act 1998, s 173 – Project Grants. 
16 Oil and Gas Act 1998, s 165 – State Equity Entitlement. 
17 Mining Act 1992, s 16A – Acquisition of State Interests. 
18 Carolyn Fischer, ‘International Experience with Benefit-Sharing Instruments for Extractive Resources’ 2007 (May) 
Resources for the Future 38. 
19 Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea 1975, Preamble – National Goals and Directive Principles 
(Goals Nos 1 to 5). 
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services, such as health, education and infrastructure,20 and transparency and accountability in the 
management and distribution of benefits21 are being highlighted as reasons for the short-fall in meeting 
landholders’ expectations. 
It is the aim of this paper to use the case studies of the Porgera and Lihir gold mines to illustrate the issues 
that affect management of revenues and distribution of benefits from the exploitation of natural resources in 
PNG. The paper concludes with suggestions on how PNG could better manage and benefit from its natural 
resource wealth. 
Porgera Gold Mine 
The Porgera Gold Mine is located at the head of the Porgera Valley, Enga Province. It is the second largest 
mine in PNG and contributes about 12 per cent to PNG’s GDP.22 The Porgera project development agreements 
were negotiated under the Mining Act 1992, under which the state involved and consulted the provincial and 
local-level governments and landowners; however, the state retained its sovereign right to negotiate the 
development contract with the developer.23 Agreements reached led to the state, Enga Provincial Government 
and Porgera landowners entering into a MOA on benefit sharing. 
Development agreements 
A number of agreements were negotiated and used as a guide for the operation of the mine through to its 
closure, and how benefits were to be distributed. These agreements included: Relocation Agreement; 
Compensation Agreement; Tripatite Agreement  and a Mining Development Contract. The MOAs were signed 
between the state, Enga Provincial Government and Porgera landowners in May 1989. A Mining Development 
Contract was also signed between the state and the Developer.24  The benefit sharing arrangements concern 
royalty payments: (1) 13 per cent to Special Mining Lease (SML) – landowners and children; (2) 10 per cent to 
Porgera Development Authority, and Enga Provincial Government to receive ‘Special Support Grant’ of 1 per 
cent of the mine production in the first ten years. This agreement has been subjected to several reviews but 
the concept of distribution of benefits remains.25 An addition to the list of beneficiaries is the Porgera 
Landowners Association, now a major beneficiary of benefit flows. 
Distribution of benefits 
The Porgera Gold Mine has produced approximately PGK (Kina or K) 16.4 billion. Approximately K6.4 billion in 
benefits has been distributed to several groups and institutions:26 Porgera Landowners  – K1 178 901 394; 
Porgera Development Authority (PDA) – K130 212 706); Enga Provincial Government – K278 916 164, Enga 
Province – K424 378 635, National Government – K1 712 897 426. However, although these benefits have 
purportedly been paid, there is a lack of transparency and accountability27 related to their equitable 
management and distribution of the benefits.28 
                                                        
20 Aaron Batten, ‘Service Delivery and Resource Revenues in PNG’ on PNGBlogs (29 June 2011) 
<http://devpolicy.org/service-delivery-and-resource-revenues-png20110629/Service Delivery and Resource Revenues in 
PNG>. 
21 Stuart Kirsch, ‘Property Effects, Social Networks and Compensation Claims in Melanesia’ (2001) 9(2) European Association 
of Social Anthropology 147, 156; K Afosa, ‘Financial Reporting in the Mining Sector: The Case for Landowner Reports in 
Papua New Guinea’ (2005) 15(36) Australian Accounting Review 89, doi:10.1111/j.1835-2561.2005.tb00296.x; Glenn Banks, 
‘Landowner Equity in Papua New Guinea’s Mineral Sector: Review and Policy Issues’ (2003) 27(3) Natural Resources Forum 
224; Banks (2008) above n 6, 31-32; M Macintyre, Wendy Mee and Fiona Solomon, ‘Evaluating Social Performance in the 
Context of an “Audit Culture”: A Pilot Social Review of a Gold Mine in Papua New Guinea’, (2007) 15(2) Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Environmental Management 100, 106 [2], doi:10.1002/csr.155; Susan Toft, ‘Patrons or Clients? Aspects 
of Multinational Capital-Landowner Relations in Papua New Guinea’ in Susan Toft (ed), Compensation for Resource 
Development in Papua New Guinea (Law Reform of Papua New Guinea, Monograph No 6, and Resource Management in Asia 
and the Pacific Research School of Pacific & Asian Studies, ANU and the National Centre for Development Studies, ANU, 
1997) 12-13. 
22 Greg Anderson (ed), Papua New Guinea Chamber of Mines and Petroleum Profile 2013, (PNG Chambers of Mines and 
Petroleum, 12th ed, 2012), 113. 
23 Filer, above n 9, 240 [1]. 
24 Peter Johnson, ‘Lode Shedding: A Case Study of the Economic Benefit to the Landowners, the Provincial Government and 
the State, from the Porgera Gold Mine: Background and Financial Flows from the Mine’ (National Research Institute 
Discussion Paper No 124, 2012) 7. 
25 Colin Filer and Benedict Imbun, ‘A Short History of Mineral Development Policies in Papua New Guinea, 1972-2002’ in R J 
May (ed), Policy Making and Implementation: Studies from Papua New Guinea (ANU E Press, 2009) Ch 6. 
26 Johnson, above n 24, 10-12. 
27 Ibid 88 [8]. 
28 Ibid. 
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The method of distribution and diligence of allocation is not effective, and landowners are not satisfied with 
the management of benefits. There is an absence of due diligence in record keeping, including lack of data on 
how the funds are distributed and projects implemented. Lack of information and data on the method of 
distribution makes it difficult to ascertain just how much and where the funds have gone and who has been 
paid. It is equally difficult to ascertain the impact of project funds on the communities and province 
generally.29 For example, the PDA has not provided any information on how the benefits are being used, which 
has led to landowners disputing the amount of benefits flows from the project as promised by the developer. 
Lack of information also makes it difficult for the beneficiaries to know and understand exactly what amount 
of funds is being spent by the leaders in their community and on what.30  Thus, while the Porgera Mine has 
paid different government institutions and landowner groups royalties, levies and development grants under 
the MOA, it is clear that ‘government institutions on the ground are not doing what they were expected to do’ 
and ‘these accounts are managed by faceless people’.31 Hence, for those landowners and communities who 
should be benefiting from the mineral wealth, the payment arrangement system makes it difficult to keep a 
concise and credible trail of these payments; transactions are such that there is a payment to an agency and, 
from there, the benefit disappears, not reaching the intended recipient. 
Lack of transparency at all levels of government,32 including weaknesses in the government’s operating, 
accounting and auditing system, have encouraged the misuse of benefits for purposes outside of the agreed 
arrangement. In addition, failure in reporting the details of payments from and to mining project 
stakeholders33 leads to distrust by landowners of developers. For example, the Porgera Landowners Association 
(PLOA), formed to represent landowners from surrounding traditional lands around the Porgera Gold Mine,34 
has failed to serve the interests of landowners, and information on PLOA’s financial performance is limited.35  
Expectations of landowners 
Royalty payments to the PLOA to 2010 amount to K16 500 000.00, about 12 per cent of the mine’s royalties.36 
However, as already noted, there are disputes as to where these funds have been invested or who has control 
over the funds due to lack of accounting and transparent disclosure; a significant amount of royalties are 
untraceable and unaccounted for.37 No accountability has been enforced and the lack of transparency has led 
to much mistrust38 by landowners of the way the funds are being distributed. No audit of PLOA accounts has 
been undertaken despite efforts by landowners for access to this information.39 Company records are also not 
updated. Many landowners complain that embezzlement of royalty payments is common and that ordinary 
landowners are not benefiting.40 
Lihir Gold Limited 
Lihir Gold Limited (LGL) operates an open pit mine on Niolam Island in the New Ireland Province,41 PNG. Like 
the Porgera Mine, Lihir contributes about 12 per cent to PNG’s GDP.42 The benefit-sharing arrangements 
negotiated for the Lihir landowners and local communities catered for an integrated benefits package which 
included payments of funds derived from the mine, royalties and special support grants, direct compensation 
arrangements, and a number of community, social and infrastructure development programs43 in a number of 
ways, including direct revenues from operations, investments in public infrastructure and services, support of 
local suppliers and a range of indirect economic benefits.44 LGL is now wholly owned by Newcrest Ltd in a 
                                                        
29 Ibid 96 [2]-[6]. 
30 Ibid 96 [4]. 
31 Ibid 88-90. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Banks, above n 21, 227 [5]. 
35 Ibid 227 [6]. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Johnson above n 24, 88 [6]. 
38 Ibid 90 [2]. 
39 Ibid 88-90. 
40 Wikipedia, Porgera Landowners Association <http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=The_Porgera_ 
Landowners_Association&oldid=559262967>. 
41 Anderson, above n 22, 96 [8]-[9]. 
42 Ibid 99. 
43 Ibid, 98-99. 
44 Ibid 100 [3]-[6]. 
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court-approved arrangement.45 However prior to this takeover, when negotiations for the development of the 
Lihir project commenced, the project proponent, Lihir Gold Ltd, was owned by a number of shareholders, 
including Rio Tinto, Orogen Minerals and Mineral Resources Lihir (which is a landowner company holding equity 
on behalf of the Lihir landowners).46 
Development agreement 
The negotiations for benefit sharing arrangements between the landowners, the state and mining company 
covers compensation, royalties, business development and an option that would allow landowners to acquire 
equity47 in the project. Following agreement on the benefit sharing arrangements, a MOA was signed between 
the state, Lihir Mining Area Landowners Association (six landowning clans) and the Nimamar Development 
Authority (local government business arm) on 26 April 1995. The agreement contained the following benefit 
sharing arrangements:48 (i) Option for Lihirians to take up 15 per cent equity in participation in the initial Lihir 
Joint Venture (equity to be held on its behalf by the Mineral Resources Development Authority (MRDC) based 
on the price that MRDC would pay for Mineral Resources Lihir to participate in the joint venture); (ii) in 
addition to the 15 per cent equity, the state offered to use its best endeavours to secure a further option to 
purchase 5 per cent at market value of the shares offered in the market for Lihir Gold Ltd.49 However these 
shares were to be purchased by the landowner company from its own pocket and were not subject to the 
terms of the original 15 per cent50 equity in the company. 
According to a deed of settlement for the Lihir Equity Trust, any surplus dividends (after repayment of loans 
and interest) would be distributed to the following beneficiaries: (i) 50 per cent of such to be used for funding 
of projects in education, health and infrastructure51 to assist communities within the Lihir group of Islands, or, 
alternatively, funds can be used to purchase rights in Lihir Gold Ltd; and (ii) 50 per cent to be distributed in 
individual payments by cheque to every 18 year-old male and female Lihirian.52 
Distribution of benefits 
Following a corporate re-structure of the company in 2005, Mineral Resources Lihir sold its shares for purposes 
of repaying a loan which MRDC had taken out on its behalf to purchase its equity stake in Lihir gold. Mineral 
Resources Lihir is now operating as a legal entity under its own name, MRL Capital Limited (MRLC),53 which is 
the investment arm of the Lihir landowners company.54 MRL Capital now has a total asset base worth over 
K600 000 000 and owns a subsidiary company, MRL Pty Ltd, which is listed on the Australian and PNG Stock 
Exchange55 with close to 50 per cent of its portfolio made up of income assets, including cash, short-term 
deposits and fixed interests, and a property portfolio both in PNG and Australia.56 
Another direct beneficiary of the Lihir Gold Mine development is the Anitua Group of Companies. The Anitua 
Group of Companies is a shareholder company comprising of six clans from the Lihir Islands and includes the 
local-level government business arm. The company was established to enable the landowners to participate in 
the business spin-off from the Lihir gold development project. This landowner group has grown to become the 
largest single suppliers of goods and services to Lihir Gold Ltd and is looking at expanding their services to 
other sectors within PNG,57 an aspect that makes the Group stand out from the Porgera Landowners 
Association, which is struggling to make an impact on the lives of landowners and communities in Porgera area. 
The Anitua Group of Companies has been involved in a range of business activities and with a range of 
different. It partners has activities which includes offering packages of services in project construction, camp 
management, security, mining services and more. The Group’s impressive portfolio of businesses includes: 
Anitua Constructions; Anitua Corporate Services; Anitua Farms; Anitua Hardware; Anitua Investments; Anitua 
                                                        
45 LGL, Scheme of Arrangement Becomes Effective (Latest Announcements, 30 August 2010) 1 
<http://lihir.ipb.icemedia.com.au/asp/index.asp>. 
46 Banks (2003), above n 21, 229 [2]. 
47  Ibid, 229 [4]. 
48  Ibid, 229 [7]. 
49 Ibid 229-230 [9]. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid 230 [3]. 
52 Ibid. 
53 MRL Capital Limited (MRLC) <http://www.mrlcapital.com.pg/>. 
54 Ibid 1 [1]. 
55 MRL Capital Limited (MRLC), 1-3 <http://www.mrlcapital.com.pg/index.php?view=article&catid=25%3Athe-
project&id=47%3Aabout&format=pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=53>. 
56 MRL Capital Limited above n 54, 90 [10]. 
57 Anitua, The Strength of a Team that is on Your Side <http://www.anitua.com.au/index.php/the-anitua-group>. 
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Mining Services; Anitua Properties; Anitua Radial Drilling Services; Anitua Security Services; Anitua 
Supermarket; Anitua Transport Services; Lihir Auto Services; Lihir Investments (Australia) and NCS Holdings.58 
For the Lihir landowners, the distribution of benefits to landowners has worked and the landowner companies 
have built in an investment structure and made sustainable use of their dividends, noting the risks that 
landowners take in equity participation in resource projects.  
Expectation of landowners 
The Lihir landowners believe that their interests are paramount and investment decisions are targeted towards 
the protection, preservation and growth in their investments for the benefit of more than 14 000 of its clan 
members. The landowners’ primary focus is to build an investment portfolio that will be able to support them 
after closure of the mine.59 
Issues that affect better management and distribution of benefits 
Revenues generated from exploiting rich natural resources can greatly increase funding for social service 
delivery. However, issues such as weak public sector capacity to implement expenditure plans, including 
funding for key items such as health, education and infrastructure,60 continue to inhibit delivery of social 
services. With few exceptions (eg, the Lihir case study described above), there appears to be no control over 
what programs are funded and who gets paid. There is no efficient and transparent system of accounting and 
auditing mechanisms. To benefit from the exploitation of its resources, PNG must establish a system of 
management that addresses issues of land tenure, claims for compensation and equity participation. In 
addition, PNG must introduce a public finance system which is transparent in how benefits are distributed.61 In 
other words, PNG must establish a governance systems aimed at improving performance, transparency and 
accountability in the management of wealth acquired through the exploitation of its natural resources.62 
Establishing measures in all levels of government to ensure that institutions have the checks and balances 
mechanisms necessary to guard against bad behaviour63 would assist in the governance and management of 
revenue generated and the distribution of benefit flow. Legal instruments exist, such as the Public Finance 
Management Guidelines and Procedures (Pubic Finance Management Act 1995),64 Public Service Commission 
(Public Service General Orders – Public Services (Management) Act 1995)65 and the Ombudsman Commission 
(Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership66 (Leadership Code)). However, for these 
instruments to be effective in arresting bad behaviour and increasing financial accountability,67 responsible 
institutions must be appropriately funded and empowered. 
In particular, the Public Service General Orders are Codes that govern the conditions and terms of employment 
contracts and disciplinary processes of all public servants (excluding Departmental Heads) employed by the 
state, must be used to police bad behaviour, including nepotism (‘wantok system’).68 
Overall, a review of the laws and procedures relating to matters of benefit sharing should be undertaken to 
determine how systems could be improved to enhance accountability, governance and transparency in 
governance by responsible institutions. It is necessary for government to create a systematic audit trail of 
payments from mining companies to all parties: national, provincial and local governments, and landholders, 
                                                        
58 Ibid. 
59 LGL, above n 46, 1 
60 Batten, above n 20. 
61 Afosa, above n 21; Banks (2003), above n 21, 224 [4]; Banks (2008) above n 6, 31-32 [5]; Macintyre et al, above n 21; Toft, 
above n 21;	  Kirsch, above n 21. 
62 Australian Agency for International Development, ‘The Economy of Papua New Guinea: Macroeconomic Policies: 
Implications for Growth and Development in the Informal Sector’ (Economic Insights Pty Ltd, International Development 
Issues, No 53, June 1999) 47-50 [9]. 
63 Australian Agency for International Development, ‘Papua New Guinea: The Role of Government in Economic Development, 
International Development’ (Economic Insights Pty Ltd, Issues No 33, 1994) 132. 
64 Public Finance (Management) Act 1995 (PNG) s 5 – Responsibilities of Heads of Departments, s 6 – Accountable Officers, s 7 
– Responsibility of Public Office-Holder in Relation to Collection of Revenue, and s 8 – Finance Inspectors, s 11– Keeping of 
Public Account. 
65 Public Services (Management) Act 1995 (PNG), s 13 – Powers of the Commission and s 18 – Review of Personnel Matters 
Connected with the National Public Service. 
66 Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership, s 13 – Misappropriation of funds of Papua New Guinea,  
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and government should ensure that the roles and responsibilities of beneficiaries are properly demarcated so 
that policies for the delivery of social services are implemented, managed, monitored, evaluated and audited 
at the local level69 This initiative would increase the accountability and governance of these institutions and 
the implementation of approved developmental projects.70 With regard to the identity of beneficiaries, a 
review and amendment to sections 12 and 13 of the Civil Registration Act 196371 requiring mandatory 
registration of all births, marriage and deaths of Papua New Guineans would greatly assist government to 
establish the identity all members of a clan, tribe or community, and to determine eligibility to benefits from 
a resource development. Registration can lead to minimising fraudulent claims for compensations and resource 
benefits as well as determine allocations for infrastructure programs. Overall, it will enhance accounting and 
auditing of benefits and financial flows, and minimise disputes relating to ownership claims and transaction 
costs, as well as ensuring that benefits are equitably distributed to the impacted landowners within PNG.72 
Recommendations 
The Porgera and Lihir landowner groups took into consideration a number of common factors when negotiating 
for benefits in a resource development forum. These matters involved payments for royalties, equity 
participation, re-location and re-settlement, compensation for future generation, and social and 
environmental impacts. However, there is great disparity in the governance of the management and 
distribution of benefit flows between the two cases: the Lihir landowners group of companies are investing 
their benefits and reaping returns, but there is not much information on the benefit flows for the Porgera 
landowners. Why is there so much disparity? The difficulty faced by Porgera landowners is that there is no 
reporting and accounting of how much benefit is paid and where it is spent? There is no audit of the company 
records, which is complicated by the fact that there is no mandatory legal requirement to file company 
records. In addition, it is difficult to pinpoint where accountability lies; is it at the time that proposals for 
projects or services are made or is it when appropriating or implementing projects. In both cases, there is no 
requirement for the landowner groups to invest their newly acquired wealth. The landowners are left to 
determine their own destiny. Is it government’s responsibility to establish and ensure that these entities 
comply with some regulatory framework and procedures in the management and distribution of benefits? 
Currently there appears to be no government processes to keep track of the payments of benefits. 
However, it is encouraging to see that the Lihir landowner companies are determined to make every 
investment profitable for their shareholders and for future generation in anticipation of the eventual closure 
of the mine. Although some investments are risky, the Lihir landowners are hopeful and currently enjoying 
their benefits. The Lihir landowner companies provide a good example of what can be achieved. 
To encourage better management of benefits derived from the development of natural resources by all groups 
in PNG, the government needs to streamline the governance of natural resources. There must be due process 
and accountability in decision-making processes to ensure that distribution of benefits significantly improves 
the lives of the beneficiaries and the country as a whole, and to eliminate conflicts of interests. Landowners 
must be empowered to invest their benefits in a range of economic projects or become equity participants in 
projects. To produce such streamlining requires a reform of government policies and regulations governing the 
development of the natural resource and distribution of benefits. 
Overall, the Organic Law on Provincial and Local-Level Governments, Mining Act 1992 and Oil and Gas Act 
1998, respectively incorporate participation and eligibility for provincial and local-level governments, and 
affected landowners to negotiate benefit flows from the development of natural resource projects on their 
land or proximity to their land. These entitlements or benefits are integrated into the current system of 
distribution of benefits between the national and provincial governments, and landowners from the impacted 
resource areas73 using the formula for benefit sharing arrangements74 prescribed under both the Mining Act 
199275 and the Oil and Gas Act 1998.76 These laws have the potential to ensure good benefit sharing but 
governance arrangements inhibit their proper implementation. 
                                                        
69 Banks (2003) above n 21, 223 [1]. 
70 Johnson, above n 24, 88-90. 
71 Civil Registration Act 1963 (PNG), s 12 – Establishment of Compulsory Registration Areas and Prescribed Premises. 
72 Australian Agency for International Development, above n 64, 12-13 [5]. 
73 Anderson, above n 22, 4 [3] 
74 Ibid. 
75 Mining Act 1992 (PNG), s 16A- Acquisition of State interests. 
76 Oil and Gas Act 1998 (PNG), s 159 – Royalty, s 173 – Project Grants and s 165 – State Equity Entitlement. 
